We propose new multivariate cryptosystems over n-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q based on idea of hidden discrete logarithm problem for F * q . These cryptosystems are based on hidden eulerian equations x α = a, (α, q − 1) = 1. The method is based on the idea of Eulerian transformations, which allow us to use asymmetric algorithms based on families of nonlinear multiplicatively injective maps of prescribed polynomial density and flexible degree.
On Post Quantum and Multivariate Cryptography
Post Quantum Cryptography serves for the research on asymmetrical cryptographical algorithms which can be potentially resistant against attacks based on the use of a quantum computer.
The security of currently popular algorithms are based on the complexity of the following 3 known hard problems: integer factorisation, discrete logarithm problem, discrete logarithm for elliptic curves.
Each of these problems can be solved in polynomial time by Peter Shor's algorithm for theoretical quantum computer.
Despite that the known nowadays small experimental examples of quantum computer are not able to attack currently used cryptographical algorithm, cryptographers have already started research on postquantum security. They have also count on the new results of general complexity theory.
The history of international conferences on Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) started in 2006. We have to notice that Post Quantum Cryptography differs from Quantum Cryptography, which is based on the idea of usage of quantum phenomena to reach better security.
Modern PQC is divided into several directions such as Multivariate Cryptography, Lattice base Cryptography, Hash based Cryptography, Code based Cryptography, studies of isogenies for superelliptic curves.
and their flag system. Bijective multivariate sparse encryption maps of rather high degree based on walks in algebraic graphs were proposed in [5] .
One of the first usage of non bijective map of multivariate cryptography was in oil and vinegar cryptosystem proposed in [6] and analysed in [7] . Nowadays this general idea is strongly supported by publication [8] devoted to security analysis of direct attacks on modified unbalanced oil and vinegar systems. This algorithm was patented. It looks like such systems and rainbow signatures schemes may lead to promising Public Key Schemes of Multivariate Encryption defined over finite fields. Non bijective multivariate sparse encryption maps of degree 3 and ≥ 3 based on walks on algebraic graphs D(n, K) defined over general commutative ring and their homomorphic images were proposed in [9] .
The new cryptosystems with non bijective multivariate encryption maps on the affine space Z m n into itself was presented at the international conference DIMA 2015 (Discrete Mathematics and its applications, Minsk, 2015). It uses the plainspace Z * m n , where n = k(k − 1)/2, k ≥ 2 can be arbitrary natural number. The private key space is formed by sequence of general multivariate polynomials from Z m [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k−1 ] and sequence of parameters l i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 which are mutually prime with φ(m). The properties of the encryption map depends heavily on the prime factorisation of m. This non bijective encryption map is the deformation of special computation generated by Schubert automaton of "k−1 dimensional projective geometry" over Z m . This method does not use the partition of variables into groups, non bijective nature of the map caused by zero devisors of composite integer m. In fact the idea of multiple "hidden RSA" is used in [10] .
Other algorithm exploits "hidden RSA" idea is described in [11] . In section 2 we introduce a concept of multiplicatively injective maps, Eulerian diagonal maps and an idea of their use for the construction of cryptosystems.
On Eulerian public key schemes
We refer to the equation x α = b in the field F q as Eulerian equation if (α, q − 1) = 1. It is well known that this equation has a unique solution.
We say that multivariate map F : F q n → F q n is Eulerian map over field if F is injective on Ω = F q * ) n and equation F ((x) = b, x ∈ Ω has exactly one solution. Similar idea of Eulerian map over Z m is presented in [10] and [11] . In this paper we suggest encryption scheme based on the following idea of diagonal Eulerian transformation of the affine space over F q . We say that the polynomial map G of F q n to F q n is multiplicatively injective if its restriction on F q * n is injective. So bijective polynomial maps and Eulerian maps are multiplicatively injective.
Let us consider a transformation τ A,i 1 ,i 2 ,...,in of F * q n to itself of kind x i → y i , where
ann , where (a ii , q − 1) = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, 0 ≤ a i,j < q − 1 and sequence L of elements i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n is a permutation on {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let A be a triangular matrix with entries a i,j as above. We refer to a map of kind τ A,L S, where S is a monomial linear transformation x i → λ i x π(i) for which λ i ∈ F q * , i = 1, 2, . . . , n and π is a permutation on {1, 2, . . . , n} as monomial Eulerian map E τ A,L ,S . We say that τ is Eulerian element if it is a composition of several monomial Eulerian maps. It is clear that τ sends variable x i to a certain monomial term. The decomposition of τ into product of Eulerian monomial transformations
Assume that a polynomial transformation F of F q n written in standard form has a polynomial degree d (maximal degree of monomial terms) and polynomial density. We can take a bijective affine map T of F q n to itself and form the map G = τ F T of finite degree bounded by some linear function in variable n. We refer to G as Eulerian deformation of F . If F has density of size O(n t ) then the density of G is O(n t+1 ).
It is clear that the Eulerian deformation of multiplicatively injective map over the finite field is also multiplicatively injective transformation.
Let us consider the asymmetrical encryption scheme based on the pair F , D, where F is multiplicatively injective transformation of F q n and D is the data (private key) which allows to solve the equation F (x) = b for x ∈ Ω in polynomial time.
As usually key holder Alice has (F, D) and public user Bob has only the map F in standard form. So Bob forms plaintext p ∈ Ω and sends the ciphertext c = F (p) to Alice. Alice uses D and solves F (x) = c for unknown tuple x for the decryption.
Let us consider the modification of the above scheme via Eulerian deformation G = τ F T , Alice will use new data D obtained by adding maps τ , S, T to D. Alice sends the encryption rule G to public user Bob. Bob sends c = G(p). Alice computes d = T −1 c. She forms tuple of unknowns y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ). She uses data D to get the solution b of F (y) = d. Finally, she computes the b as S −1 (b) and gets the plaintext as a solution of Eulerian system τ x = b . This scheme can be applied to various known pairs (F, D), where F is bijective map. For instance we can take stable cubical transformation of K n into itself defined into [12] or [13] in case when K = F q for chosen parameter q or nonstable maps of [6] .
In this paper we concentrate on Eulerian maps, when D contains information on triangular system of Eulerian equations over F q of kind
, a j , j = 1, 2, . . . , s are nonzero elements of F q , i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i s is a permutation on {1, 2, . . . , s}, (α ii , q − 1) = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , s.
We refer to the map F : x j → h j (x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x is ), j = 1, 2, . . . , s as triangular Eulerian map. Assume that α ii , i = 1, 2, . . . , s are unknown. Other coefficients are available together with the solution d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s . Then finding α ii , i = 1, 2 , . . . , s can be done via consequtive solution of discrete logarithm problem:
). In the case when parameter q is large the determination of discrete logarithm is a known hard problem.
Notice that parameters α i,j (as well as a i,j of the diagonal affine transformation) will be unknown for the public user Bob in the described above cryptosystem. So we can talk about hidden discrete logarithm. EXAMPLE 1. Let us consider a cryptosystem based on the deformation of written above Eulerian triangular map F of F q n . The map F is defined by parameters a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n from F q * , triangular matrices A and a list of elements
. Polynomials b i of constant degrees t i can be specially chosen to make the density of F of prescribed size O(n d ) for certain constant d. We can choose matrix A to make the degree of F bounded by some constant t.
Alice takes sequence of triangular matrices
She takes strings λ 1 i , λ 2 i , . . . , λ n i and permutations π i to form monomial linear transformations S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Alice chooses matrix B and vector c to form bijective affine transformation T sending x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) into xB + c.
Alice computes the polynomial map
and writes G in standard form. The degree of G is bounded by t 1 t 2 . . . t k t and its density is of size O(n t+1 ). Alice sends the standard form of G to public user Bob.
Bob writes a plaintext p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) ∈ F q * n . He computes the ciphertext G(p) and sends it to Alice.
Alice uses her knowledge on the decomposition 
We can see that c 1 is the plaintext. EXAMPLE 2. Let K be a commutative ring. We define A(n, K) as bipartite graph with the point set P = K n and line set L = K n (two copies of a Cartesian power of K are used).
We will use brackets and parenthesis to distinguish tuples from P and L. So (p) = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) ∈ P n and [l] = l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n ) ∈ L n . The incidence relation I = A(n, K) (or corresponding bipartite graph I) is given by condition pIl if and only if the equations of the following kind hold.
Let us consider the case of finite commutative ring K, |K| = m.
As it instantly follows from definition the order of our bipartite graph A(n, K) is 2m n . The graph is m-regular. Really, the neighbour of given point p is given by above equations, where parameters p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n are fixed elements of the ring and symbols l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n are variables. It is easy to see that the value for l 1 could be freely chosen. This choice uniformly establishes values for l 2 , l 3 . . . , l n . So each point has precisely m neighbours. In similar way we observe the neighbourhood of the line, which also contains m neighbours. We introduce the colour ρ(p) of the point p and the colour ρ(l) of line l as parameter p 1 and l 1 respectively. Graphs A(n, K) with colouring belong to class of linguistic graphs defined in [14] . In the case of linguistic graph Γ the path consisting of its vertices v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k is uniquely defined by initial vertex v 0 and colours ρ(v i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , k of other vertices from the path.
So the following symbolic computation can be defined. Take the symbolic point x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) where x i are variables and symbolic key which is a string of polynomials . We use term symbolic point to point computation in the case of even k and talk on symbolic point to line computation in the case of odd k. We notice that the computation of each coordinate of v i via variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n and polynomials f 1 (x), f 2 (x), . . . , f i (x) needs only arithmetical operations of addition and multiplication. Final vertex v s (point or line) has coordinates (h 1 (x 1 ), h 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), h 3 (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), . . . , h n (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )), where h 1 (x 1 ) = f s (x 1 ).
Assume that K = F q (m=q) and the equation of kind f s (x) = b has at most one solution under condition that x ∈ F * q . Then the map H : x i → h(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , n is a multiplicatively injective map. If the equation of kind f s (x) = b, x ∈ F * q has the unique solution then H is bijection. In the case of finite parameter s and finite densities of f i (x), i = 1, 2, . . . , s the map H also have finite density. If all parameters deg(f i (x)) are finite then the map H has a linear degree. For simplicity we set f s (x) = ax r + b, where (r, q − 1)) = 1. It means that we can substitute kernel map F in the case of example 1 by map H.
. . τ As,Ls S k HT written in standard form has linear density and constant degree.
Let N g(x) be the operator on P ∪ L be the operator sending vertex (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) (point or line) to its neighbour of colour g(x 1 ). In the case of symbolic key defined via choice of f 1 (x) and recurrent relations of kind f i+1 (x) = g i (f i (x)), i = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1 the map H is a composition of
. So in the case of bijective map N 1 N 2s is an example of invertible decomposition of H in sense of [4] .
The following cases of maps with prescribed density can be also used for the implementations. 1) Let in the case of even s we have f i (x) = h(x) + b i for odd i = 1, 3, . . . , s − 1 where h(x) has a chosen degree α. For even i = 2, 4, . . . , s we set f i (x) = x + c i . From results of [15] we can deduce that degree of H is 2α + 1. It is easy to see that H is bijective. Let T 1 be bijective affine transformation of the free module F q n . One can take the composition H 1 = T 1 H. Independently from the size of s = l(n) the degree of H 1 is t = 2α + 1. So its density is O(n t ).
It means that we can substitute kernel map F in the case of example 1 by map T 1 H. The map G = τ A 1 ,L 1 S 1 τ A 2 ,L 2 S 2 . . . τ As,Ls S s H 1 T written in standard form density O(n t+1 ).
2) Let us choose odd parameter s. As in the case above f i (x) = h(x)+b i for odd i = 1, 3, . . . , s and for even i = 2, 4, . . . , s−1 equalities f i (x) = x+c i hold. We set h(x) = ax r +b, , a ∈ F q * . So the map H is multiplicatively injective. We can check that the degree of H is t = α + 2. Let T 2 be a bijective affine transformation of F q n of kind x 1 → λx 1 , x 2 = l 2 (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), x 3 = l 3 (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), . . . , x n = l n (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where λ ∈ F q * and l i ∈ F q [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ] are of degree 1. We set H 2 = T 2 H. The encryption map G = τ A 1 ,L 1 S 1 τ A 2 ,L 2 S 2 . . . τ As,Ls S s H 2 T has density O(n α+3 ).
MODIFIED EXAMPLES 1 and 2.
One can change the field F q in examples 1 and 2 for ring Z m , where m is some composite number. It leads to change of F * q for Z * m , integer q − 1 for φ(m), where φ is Euler function, graph A(n, F q ) for A(n, Z m ). Detailed description is in [16] .
